Lattices of tilings : an extension to figures with holes

We first prove that the set of domino tilings of a fixed finite figure is a distributive lattice, even in the case when the figure has holes. Afterwards, we give a geometrical interpretation of the order given by this lattice. We extend these results to other types of tilings (calisson tilings, tilings with bicolored Wang tiles)

Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

We consider an alternative expression of the Shapley value that reveals a system of compensations: each player receives an equal share of the worth of each coalition he belongs to, and has to compensate an equal share of the worth of any coalition he does not belong to. We give an interpretation in terms of formation of the grand coalition according to an ordering of the players and define the corresponding compensation vector. Then, we generalize this idea to cooperative games with a communication graph. Firstly, we consider cooperative games with a forest (cycle-free graph). We extend the compensation vector by considering all rooted spanning trees of the forest (see Demange 2004) instead of orderings of the players. The associated allocation rule, called the compensation solution, is characterized by component efficiency and relative fairness. The latter axiom takes into account the relative position of a player with respect to his component. Secondly, we consider cooperative games with arbitrary graphs and construct rooted spanning trees by using the classical algorithms DFS and BFS. If the graph is complete, we show that the compensation solutions associated with DFS and BFS coincide with the Shapley value and the equal surplus division respectively.

Tiling with Bars and Satisfaction of Boolean Formulas

AbstractLetFbe a figure formed from a finite set of cells of the planar square lattice. We first prove that the problem of tiling such a figure with bars formed from 2 or 3 cells can be reduced to the logic problem 2-SAT. Afterwards, we deduce a linear-time algorithm of tiling with these bars

On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core

This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coalition structure core, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or equal to (n*n+4n)/4, where n is the cardinality of the player set. This number considerably improves the upper bound found so far by Koczy and Lauwers (2004).coalition structure core; excess function; payoff configuration; outsider independent domination.